Normal incident response procedures were not enough
Two incident responders were assigned to the case » Work was done when regular duty officer weeks and other tasks allowed » Scraping the files took longer than expected -the first case of this size, so we had no tools for forensics or analysing ready at hand » Counted together, months of hands-on work for both going through data and preparing the notifications Additional tool development went hand in hand with forensics and other preparations 
ColdFusion scan
We performed a scan for all CF backdoor URLs we found.
We started by doing HTTP HEAD requests to all affected sites. We then retrieved the full page for all those with relevant responses.
We identified two versions of the backdoor, one password protected and one world-readable.
Both versions contained unique identifiers we could use for identifying the backdoor.
A few greps later we had a list of still vulnerable servers 6 months after the initial compromise took place. 
Challenges in coordination
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Challenges in coordination
The data was and still is part of active LE investigation -sharing the original data (the HD image) to other teams not possible 
Going through automation would lead to sending numerous emails to upstream providers, DNS providers and other 3rd parties » Some of them might feel it'd not be their job to contact the potential victims » The service provider might not be the actual SP of the victim » We did not have resources to individually advise all affected service providers This in mind, we took option C: National CERTs » There are still some countries without a clear national PoC | Reporting example: ColdFusion ************************ CERT-FI Incident ID: 769806 *********************************************** CERT-FI is currently busy analysing information related to a series of security breaches. This work will take some time due to the high volume of data involved.
Our intention is to provide relevant results of the analysis to appropriate national CERT teams in order to reach the victims found within their constituencies. We will also inform the teams when all of the data has been analysed. This is the third batch of this kind and the last regarding ColdFusion. 
Plesk panel vector
The attackers utilized a SQL-injection vulnerability in enterprise/control/agent.php (CVE-2012 (CVE- -1557 to gain access to the Plesk Panel API RPC and download server configuration backups. The backup was then deleted from the server. 
